What the provider must put in
Power, bandwidth, compute, uptime, maintenance, accurate location, or response to demand. Honest effort means supplying the required service under the conditions the provider actually faces.
Work verification model
Estimate whether protocol rules support honest service.
DePIN protocols rely on independent providers to perform real-world work. Because effort cannot be observed directly, protocols use audits and economic consequences. This estimator compares the savings from a shortcut with the expected loss created by its higher audit failure rate.
Model setting
How verification works
The protocol cannot watch a provider work. It sees evidence from occasional audits, then uses the result to decide whether the provider keeps its stake and normal rewards.
How the protocol checks the work
A challenge, proof, measurement, telemetry check, or auditor report that returns pass or fail. Audits can make mistakes, so what matters is how much more often a shortcut fails than honest service.
1Provider actionHonest service or a shortcut
→
2Service evidenceObserved by the audit layer
→
3Pass or failPublic protocol outcome
→
4Protocol responseStake and future rewards
Current example
Honest service costs 10.00 USD and fails 5.00% of audits. The shortcut costs 8.00 USD and fails 15.00%.
It saves 2.00 USD and fails 10.00 percentage points more often.
1
Monitoring
Estimate how much a shortcut can gain.
Start by setting a performance target for the audit. When measurements are available, switch modes to check whether the audit meets that target.
Costs and rewards are per provider per reward period. Stake and identity cost are total amounts. Convert tokens to expected USD value if their price may change during the period.
Required added fail chance when audited50.00%
If a shortcut can save 10.00 USD, it must be at least 50.00 percentage points more likely to fail when audited.
This is a design requirement, not a claim about the current audit. The evidence mode provides the checks needed to validate it.
If a provider can stop paying one of these costs without changing the audit result, penalties cannot enforce that part of the service.
If small reductions look identical to honest service, either allow and price that lower service level or improve the audit.
Why start with the audit instead of an attack list?An attack list can always miss a cheaper way to pass+
A red-team exercise only covers shortcuts the team thought to test. A safer approach asks how cheaply a provider could produce something the audit accepts. Storage proofs, wireless challenge routes, and compute-output tests each give a different way to estimate that cost.
If the audit misses part of the service, add a check for it, allow the cheaper behavior and lower the honest cost, or state clearly that the protocol does not enforce it.
Use this option only if the estimate covers the hardest shortcut you believe is feasible, not simply the last shortcut tested.
The normal failure rate from Additional inputs is included automatically. If the proof checks stored bytes but not availability or retrieval, those services need their own checks.
Test groups of nearby or collaborating providers using your actual check-routing rules. Keep the group with the largest saving relative to its chance of being checked from outside. This gives a minimum penalty to consider, but it cannot prove that every possible group is covered.
Compare quantized, pruned, smaller, or otherwise cheaper models on the same requests used by the audit. Keep the setup with the largest saving relative to how clearly its outputs differ. Testing only familiar setups may miss a cheaper one.
Loss needed if audited every period$20.00
A provider saves 2.00 USD and is 10.00% more likely to fail when audited.
Required loss following a fail$20.00
The provider saves 2.00 USD. With audits in every reward period, the shortcut is caught 10.00% more often overall.
2
Enforcement
Set the consequences of a failed audit.
A failed audit can take stake now and reduce later rewards. Together, those losses must outweigh what the provider gains from taking the shortcut.
Loss supplied20.00 / 20.00
Stake 10.00Future rewards 10.00Meets minimum
Cost comparisonExpected rewards, audit expense, and an alternative parameter mix+
This comparison uses the money unit selected above. It minimizes expected reward payments plus audit expense. Posted stake is shown separately because it ties up provider funds rather than becoming a routine protocol payment.
Current design
- Posted stake
- 10.00
- Reward gap
- 10.53
- Expected rewards
- 23.50
- Audit expense
- 1.00
- Rewards + audits
- 24.50
Lowest-cost grid result
- Audit probability
- 100%
- Posted stake
- 10.00
- Reward gap
- 10.53
- Reduced reward
- 13.50
- Rewards + audits
- 24.50
The search uses a 100% slash rate, one reduced-reward status, and audit probabilities from 1% to 100%.
3
Participation and identity reset
Check whether providers stay and recover.
The reduced reward after a failure must still cover honest operation. Starting over under a new identity must cost at least as much as avoiding the reduced-reward period is worth.
Participation
PassRecommended minimum13.50
10.00 operating cost + 2.00 outside option + 1.50 stake-related cost.
New identity
PassRecommended wait: 1 periodor cost 0.00
Starting over costs 11.90; avoiding reduced rewards is worth 10.00.
Additional inputsService costs, audit noise, capital cost, and protocol mechanics+
Result
All checks pass.
Under the entered estimates, honest service is at least as valuable to providers as the modeled shortcut.
Scope
This estimator assumes one reduced-reward status, honest audit reports, pass/fail results, stable operating conditions, and protocol rules that do not change unexpectedly. The result depends on the accuracy of the service-cost and audit estimates.